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FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION: THE EMERGING
INTERNATIONAL REGIME
Dinah Shelton* and Gary Rose**
INTRODUCTION
The history of the law of the sea has been dominated by a
conflict between maritime states seeking unhampered naviga-
tion and access to resources and the claims of coastal states
seeking exclusive control of adjacent seas.' At one time almost
all of the oceans of the world were claimed by a limited number
of states,2 claims eventually overcome by the international
community which recognized the benefit of seas freely accessi-
ble to all.3 Yet, coastal states have never ceased to assert their
rights over waters adjacent to their coasts.'
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Santa Clara School of Law; B.A., 1967,
J.D., 1970, University of California at Berkeley.
. Second year law student, University of Santa Clara. Aide to Congressman Paul
N. McCloskey, United States Delegation, Third United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea, August, 1976.
1. Even in antiquity, although writers favored the notion that the seas were
common to all humanity, states often made extensive claims over adjacent waters. See
H. KNIGHT, THE LAW OF THE SEA: CASES, DOCUMENTS AND READINGS 3-7 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as KNIGHT]. See also M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER
OF THE OCEANS (1962) [hereinafter cited as McDOUGAL & BURKE]; Lapidoth, Freedom
of Navigation-Its Legal History and Its Normative Basis, 6 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 259
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Lapidoth].
It should be noted that the description of a state as "maritime" or "coastal" is
not entirely accurate. Generally, maritime states may be read as referring to developed
countries and coastal states may be read as referring to third-world countries. These
latter designations were not used because they are not sufficiently descriptive of the
competing interests; developed nations are both maritime and coastal (with the excep-
tion of Poland) which does not have a substantial coastline and some third-world
countries may side with maritime interests as opposed to coastal interests.
2. Following a Papal Bull issued by Pope Alexander VI in 1493, Spain and Portu-
gal purported to divide the major oceans. Spain claimed the Western Atlantic, the Gulf
of Mexico and the Pacific Ocean. Portugal asserted ownership of the Eastern Atlantic
and the Indian Ocean. In addition, claims were made by the Republic of Venice over
the Adriatic Sea; Denmark and Sweden over the Baltic Sea; Norway and Denmark
over the North Sea; and Great Britain over parts of the North Atlantic. Lapidoth,
supra note 1, at 261-62.
3. The principle of freedom of the high seas was classically defended by Dutch
author Grotius in his book Mare Liberum. The Dutch were primarily concerned with
Portuguese attempts to prevent Dutch commerce with the East Indies. Grotius based
his theory upon the indivisibility of the seas. Because they could not be appropriated
by individual nations, they should be considered the common possession of all man-
kind. H. GROTIUS, DE JURI BELLI Ac PACIS 190-91 (1646 ed. F. Kelsey trans. 1925).
4. One reason for this is to give adequate protection to "the security of the social
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Through several centuries of claim and counter-claim, in-
ternational law has seen the balance shift from fulfilling the
demands of coastal states on the one hand, to accommodating
the navigational interests of maritime states on the other.5 Re-
cently, enhanced competition for the resources of the sea,' cou-
pled with concern over pollution of coastal waters, have pro-
duced strong demands by coastal states for a reformulation of
the presently accepted rules balancing international and local
interests.
The latest attempt of the coastal and maritime7 states to
strike a balance between their competing interests has been
undertaken at the Third United Nations Law of the Sea Con-
ference. Negotiations between coastal and maritime states at
the Third Law of the Sea Conference have produced the Re-
vised Single Negotiating Text (RSNT), Part II of which con-
tains the basic compromises between the competing interests
of maritime and coastal states. This article evaluates Part II
of the RSNT, the jurisdictional maritime zones it creates and
the rights and duties incident to those zones. It briefly de-
scribes the history of the Law of the Sea Conferences and the
basic purpose and structure of the RSNT. Then the allocation
of rights and duties to coastal and maritime states which Part
II of the RSNT makes is examined for its effect on the naviga-
tional rights of merchant and naval vessels. The article con-
cludes by suggesting that while Part II of the RSNT may shift
the balance in favor of the interests of coastal states and mar-
ine resource exploitation, the text contains the basic ingredi-
ents necessary to protect navigational freedom, the existence of
which will be necessary in the future to foster international
trade and, thus, to serve the needs of all people.
processes upon their land masses." McDoUGAL & BURKE, supra note 1, at 2. In addition
to military security, coastal interests include restricting the movement of competitive
trade, securing a monopoly over offshore seabed and fishing resources, and controlling
potential damage to the environment by ship-based pollution.
5. See Lapidoth, supra note 1, at 259.
6. Enhanced competition for the resources of the sea is due primarily to technol-
ogical developments and exhaustion of living resources.
7. The United States is one of the strongest proponents of unhampered naviga-
tion. See, e.g., REPORT ON THE LAW OF THE SEA CONFERENCE, 122 CONG. REc. E1,986-87
(daily ed. Apr. 12, 1976), in which free navigation rights is declared to be one of seven
primary United States negotiation goals: "The United States and Russia are both
desirous of maintaining maximum freedom of the high seas, particularly unimpeded
navigation through, over [aircraft] and under [submarines] straits such as Dover,
Gibralter and Malacca."
(Vol. 17
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THE HISTORY OF THE REVISED SINGLE NEGOTIATING TEXT
At present, the law of the sea is codified in four interna-
tional conventions.8 These treaties, adopted April 29, 1958,
were the result of more than ten years preparatory work by the
International Law Commission (I.L.C.), followed by negotia-
tions at the First United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea? In spite of all efforts by the Commission and by the Con-
ference, no agreement could be reached on a number of crucial
issues, the most significant being the scope of national jurisdic-
tion. 10 A second Law of the Sea Conference in 1960 "similarly
failed to establish outer limits of national jurisdiction, due in
part to disagreement between states favoring a traditional
three-mile rule"2 and those seeking to extend coastal jurisdic-
8. (1) Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, done Apr. 29,
1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter cited as CTS];
(2) Convention on the High Seas, done Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No.
5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 [hereinafter cited as CHS]; (3) Convention on the Continental
Shelf, done Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311
[hereinafter cited as CCS]; (4) Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living
Resources of the High Seas, done Apr. 29, 1958, 17 U.S.T. 138, T.I.A.S. No. 5969, 599
U.N.T.S. 285. Also negotiated was the Optional Protocol of Signature Concerning
Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, opened for signature Apr. 29, 1958, 450 U.N.T.S.
169.
9. The International Law Commission (I.L.C.), established by U.N. General
Assembly Resolution 174 (II) of November 21, 1947, selected, at its first session, the
regimes of the high seas and the territorial seas as major subjects of discussion. Prelim-
inary reports were drafted and the replies of governments solicited. These were consid-
ered by the I.L.C. at its eighth session in 1956, following which a final report was drawn
up. This report formed the basis for the 1958 Conference. I.L.C. Report, 11 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 9), U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956). The I.L.C. Report resulted in adoption
of General Assembly Resolution 1105 (XI) on February 21, 1957, instructing the Secre-
tary General to convoke an international conference. The Conference took place in 1958
in Geneva. 11 U.N. GAOR (658th plen. mtg.), Supp. (No. 17), U.N. Doc. A/3572
(1957).
10. No agreement was reached as to the breadth of the territorial sea nor as to
fishing rights within an exclusive zone. Regarding the former, the I.L.C. ifi its 1956
Report found no uniform practice among states and no agreement could be reached
during the Conference. Territorial sea is defined in the CTS from the perspective of
the coastal state as "a belt of sea adjacent to its coast." CTS, supra note 8, art. 1(1).
On the rights and duties of states within this zone, see text accompanying note 42 infra
and following.
Agreement was reached in article 24 of the CTS, however, that the contiguous zone
may not extend beyond 12 miles from the baseline. See notes 17, 34, and text accompa-
nying note 80 infra.
11. A resolution requesting another conference was adopted during the 1958 Con-
ference. G.A. Res. 1307, 13 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 18), U.N. Doc. A/4090 (1958).
12. The three-mile jurisdiction is thought to owe its existence to the cannon-shot
rule: a state maintained exclusive jurisdiction over waters within the range of the shot
of a cannon. Baty, The Three-Mile Limit, 22 AM. J. INT'L L. 503 (1928); Walker,
Territorial Waters: The Cannon-Shot Rule, 22 Barr. Y.B. INT'L L. 210 (1945).
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tion for the protection of natural resources.
Since 1960, disputes increasingly have arisen from the fail-
ure of the First and Second Law of the Sea Conferences to
resolve these jurisdictional questions. 3 In addition, technologi-
cal developments have dramatically changed ocean use, creat-
ing a need for reconsideration of the entire legal order governing
the seas. As a result, a Third Law of the Sea Conference was
convened in 1973.11 It was directed by the General Assembly to
work to provide for the establishment of an equitable interna-
tional regime governing the oceans, including the high seas, 15
continental shelf, 6 territorial seas, the contiguous zone,' 7 fish-
ing and conservation of the living resources of the high seas
(including the preferential rights of coastal states), and the
preservation of the marine environment.
The first session of the Third Conference was held in New
York beginning in December 1973.18 The first substantive meet-
ings occurred at the second session held in Caracas in 1974.
There, the various proposals submitted from among the 138
delegations were sent to three committees established for the
Conference.' The committee meetings held at the Caracas
13. Between 1960 and 1972 there was a 25% increase in the number of states
claiming a 12 mile territorial zone. Those claiming only 3 miles declined by 18%. More
importantly, in the same time period, there was a one-third increase in the number of
states claiming jurisdiction over adjacent waters outside 12 miles. I NEW DIECTIONS
IN THE LAW OF THE SEA 161 (R. Churchill, K. Simmonds & J. Welch eds. 1973)
[hereinafter cited as NEW DIRECTIONS].
14. See THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA: DOCUMENTS
OF THE CARACAS SESSION 1974 at xvi (R. Platzoder ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as
CARACAS DOCUMENTS].
15. High Seas constitute "all parts of the sea that are not included in the terri-
torial sea or in the internal waters of a state." CHS, supra, note 8, art. 1.
16. For purposes of these articles, the term 'continental shelf' is used as
referring (a) to the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent
to the coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200
meters or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent
waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said
areas; (b) to the seabed and subsoil of similar submarine areas adjacent
to the coasts of islands.
CCS, supra note 8, art. 1.
17. Article 24 of the CTS, supra note 8, provides for a zone of coastal state
authority up to 12 miles from the coast, known as the contiguous zone.
18. Its purpose was to settle organizational and procedural matters for subse-
quent Conference sessions. CARACAS DOCUMENTS, supra note 14, at xvi.
19. G.A. Res. 2750(c), 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28), U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970),
gave the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea and the Ocean
Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction authority to prepare for the Third
Conference, including, in paragraph 7, the right to establish subsidiary organs. Three
main committees were thus established: Committee I, the deep seabed; Committee
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session and at the third session, which followed in Geneva,
resulted in the elaboration of an informal single negotiating
text intended to serve as the basis for further discussions."0 By
May 1976, following the fourth session of the Conference at
New York, this document had been renegotiated and reap-
peared as the Revised Single Negotiating Text.' It formed the
basis of informal negotiations in the three committees at the
recent fifth session of the Conference. 2
According to the President of the Conference, the RSNT
is to serve the purpose of providing "a basis for continued nego-
tiation without prejudice to the right of any delegation to move
any amendments or to introduce any new proposals." The texts
are not to be regarded "as committing any delegation or delega-
tions to any of their provisions. '23
The RSNT is an aggregation of four separate texts, each
covering a distinct subject of negotiation. The first three parts
of the RSNT were developed independently by three respective
committees, while the fourth part was developed by the Presi-
dent of the Conference following a general debate on the item.2'
Part I deals with the exploration and exploitation of the sea-
bed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. Part II is primar-
ily concerned with dividing the seas into jurisdictional zones
and determining the navigational and resource exploitation
rights within each zone. Part III is devoted to the protection
and preservation of the marine environment, marine scientific
research, and the transfer of technology. Part IV deals with the
settlement of disputes.25
While some important issues still remain outstanding after
years of negotiation,"5 Part II of the RSNT has matured to the
II, jurisdiction and navigation; Committee HI, marine pollution. This structure was
maintained at the Conference on the Law of the Sea.
20. Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Informal Single
Negotiating Text, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/WP.8/Parts I-Ill (1975).
21. Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Revised Single
Negotiating Text, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/WP.8/Rev. I/Parts I-rn and U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 62/WP.9/Rev. 1 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as RSNT].
22. This session met in New York between August 2nd and September 17th,
1976. A sixth session is scheduled to begin in May, 1977.
23. RSNT, supra note 21, Note by the President of the Conference, at 1.
24. Id. at 2.
25. Part IV is technically an informal single negotiating text since it was first
presented after the fourth session of the Conference, unlike the first three parts which
resulted from the second and third sessions and were revised after the fourth. By
agreement, however, Part IV has the same status as Parts I, II, and III. Id., Note on
Part IV by the President of the Conference.
26. Outstanding issues include the jurisdictional status of the exclusive economic
1977]
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point where it now provides a model for the probable naviga-
tional regime to be established under any treaty resulting from
the Conference.Y According to the President of the Conference,
the texts were presented to the Conference
as a procedural device to carry forward the process of nego-
tiation in the expectation and the hope that the future
negotiations will help towards the attainment of general
agreement in keeping with the letter and the spirit of the
"Gentlemen's Agreement" regarding the conclusion of a
Treaty or Convention by concensus.15
PART II OF THE REVISED SINGLE NEGOTIATING TEXT: ITS EFFECT
ON TRADITIONAL MARITIME ZONES AND NAVIGATIONAL RIGHTS OF
MERCHANT VESSELS
The RSNT attempts to resolve the conflicting interests of
maritime states and coastal states. The interests which coastal
states have sought to further in the RSNT include exploitation
and management of resources in the sea and seabed contig-
uous to their shores, and extension of their territorial sea in
order to regulate a greater portion of offshore foreign maritime
activity such as naval exercises, surveillance, and the discharge
of pollutants from ships. On the other hand, maritime states
essentially want to preserve freedom of navigation over as
much of the sea as possible. 9 Since approximately eighty per-
cent of world trade moves by water,30 it is important that this
interest be protected adequately in any regime which extends
coastal state jurisdiction farther into the seas for the purpose
of exploiting natural resources.
As competition for ocean space and resources intensifies,
law must evolve new categories and concepts to effect a finer
balancing of competitive interests. With the exception of
straits, the balance struck in the RSNT between these interests
zone. See note 114 and accompanying text infra.
27. "The present Revised Single Negotiating Text represents a consensus on a
large number of issues ... including ... unimpeded passage of straits ... protecting
navigational rights, and on marine pollution." Third United Nations Conference on
the Law of the Sea, New York, Aug. 2-Sept. 17, 1976, U.S. Delegation Report, at 1
[hereinafter cited as U.S. Delegation Report] [on file at SANTA CLARA L. REv.].
28. RSNT, supra note 21, Note by the President of the Conference, at 2.
29. See, e.g., note 7 supra. See also P. MCCLOSKEY, JR., & B. GILMAN, LAW OF
THE SEA STATUS REPORT, 122 CONG. Rxc. E5,753-55 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1976)
[hereinafter cited as MCCLOSKEY & GILMAN].
30. McDOUGAL & BURKE, supra note 1, at 732.
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varies with the proximity of the sea to the coastal state. Inter-
nal waters mark the high point of coastal state authority, while
the high seas zone, farthest from coastal states, represents the
greatest freedom for navigational interests.
In Part II of the RSNT 3' the ocean has been divided into
six regions based upon this proximity, with each region estab-
lishing a unique balance between the competing interests.
Internal waters, basically comprised of waters landward of the
baseline (low tide line), are treated as land territory. Territorial
waters extend twelve nautical miles from the baseline, and
coastal states have the authority, discussed below, to prevent
maritime passage that is not innocent. Coastal states also have
the authority to prevent infringement of customs, fiscal, immi-
gration or sanitary regulations in the contiguous zone, an area
contiguous to the territorial sea and extending not more than
twenty-four nautical miles from the baseline. Archipelagic wa-
ters are those over which archipelagic states exercise special
authority.32 The high seas is the area over which all states stand
on an equal footing; where freedom of access and use is the
governing principle. Finally, the RSNT creates a new regime
within the law of the sea-the exclusive economic zone, which
extends 200 nautical miles from the baseline of a coastal state.
Under this new regime, the coastal state exercises sovereign
rights over the resources of the zone while foreign states may
pursue navigational and other interests within the zone. Each
state must have "due respect" for the other's activities therein.
Of the regions to be discussed below, the territorial sea
straits and the exclusive economic zone are the topics of great-
est interest to maritime states. These are the areas over which
coastal states have the greatest potential discretion and au-
thority to inhibit foreign navigation. If the sixth session of the
Law of the Sea Conference is to be successful, coastal states
will have to assuage the fear of maritime states that the RSNT
authorizes coastal states to gradually extend their territorial
waters to 200 miles. 3
31. All references to the RSNT will be to Part II unless otherwise noted.
32. Because archipelagic waters is an amalgamation of traditional maritime con-
cepts, it will be discussed in this part of the article although it is technically a new
zone.
33. See MCCLOSKEY & GILMAN, supra note 29, at E5,754.
1977]
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Internal Waters
Waters falling landward of the baseline34 of the territorial
sea are internal. 5 Nations enjoy basically the same preroga-
tives over internal waters as they do over their land territory.
Both the CTS35 and the RSNT 37 speak of land and internal
waters as having equal status. Neither the CTS nor the RSNT
impose any duties upon a coastal state regarding these waters,
leaving coastal states the power to exercise jurisdiction in ac-
cordance with bilateral treaties and customary practices.3 The
state retains exclusive right to control entry into these waters;
foreign vessels, except in distress, 9 enjoy no right of access and
once within internal waters are subject to coastal state jurisdic-
tion. However, where the drawing of straight baselines encloses
waters formerly not considered internal waters, the RSNT pro-
vides that such waters will be treated as territorial waters al-
lowing ships the right of innocent passage."0
Territorial Waters
Non-strait waters and the right of innocent passage. Under
the RSNT, those waters extending seaward twelve nautical
miles from the baseline along a state's coast shall be considered
territorial, settling one of the enduring controversies in modern
international law.4 Within these waters, ships of all foreign
states enjoy the right of access for the purposes of navigation.42
34. A baseline is the low-water line along a state's coast, as marked on large-scale
charts officially recognized by the coastal state. RSNT, supra note 21, art. 4. Where a
state possesses a highly irregular coastline, or a fringe of islands adjacent to the coast,
it may draw straight baselines from selected low-water points along the coast or the
island. RSNT, supra note 21, art. 6; CTS, supra note 8, art. 4. See also Anglo-
Norwegian Fisheries Case, 3 I.C.J. 132 (1951).
Establishing the low-water mark is difficult and largely left to the discretion of
the state. However, the low-water line should not, at its lowest, vary appreciably from
the median line or the spring (lowest) tides occurring over a given period along the
coast. See 1 A. SHALOWITZ, SHORE AND SEA BOUNDARIES 29 (1962) [hereinafter cited as
SHALOWITZ].
35. RSNT, supra note 21, art. 7.
36. CTS, supra note 8, art. 1.
37. RSNT, supra note 21, art. 1.
38. Wildenhus' Case, 120 U.S. 1 (1886).
39. United States v. Mexico ("Kate A. Hoff Claim"), United States/Mexican
Claims Comm'n, April 2, 1929. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 48 (1965); CTS, supra note 8, art. 14.
40. RSNT, supra note 21, art. 7. On innocent passage, see text accompanying
note 42 infra and following.
41. See SHALOWITZ, supra note 34, at 207, 210-11, 275.
42. As with article 14 of the CTS, no distinction is made between naval and
[Vol. 17
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The regime governing the exercise of this right is innocent pas-
sage, which has the following characteristics under both exist-
ing law"3 and article 16-31 of the RSNT: (1) submarines must
transit on the surface and show their flag;" (2) most aircraft
have no right of innocent passage;45 (3) the passage must not
prejudice the "peace, good order, or security of the coastal
state;"46 (4) when essential to its security, a coastal state may
suspend the right to innocent passage in specific areas of its
territorial sea without discrimination and after adequate no-
tice; 7 (5) coastal states retain limited jurisdiction over on-ship
activity.4 8
Article 24(1) grants the coastal state the authority to take
"the necessary steps in its territorial sea to prevent passage
that is not innocent." For navigational interests the crucial
question is by whom and upon what basis this innocence is
determined. The only example of non-innocent activity in the
CTS is fishing.4" Beyond that, it is largely a matter of coastal
state discretion to determine the existence of prejudice to the
"peace, good order or security of the state."5 Fearing the arbi-
trary or capricious use of this discretion,5 maritime states have
secured in the RSNT a more concrete definition of acts deemed
non-innocent and, therefore, capable of being regulated or pro-
hibited by coastal states.
Under the RSNT, non-innocent activities include: any
merchant vessels. However, Russia signed the 1958 Convention with the express reser-
vation that it would control access of foreign naval vessels to its territorial sea. Butler,
The Legal Regime of Russian Territorial Waters, 62 AM. J. INT'L L. 51-73 (1968). The
right of warship access to the territorial sea remains highly controversial. See text
accompanying note 158 infra and following.
43. The CTS, supra note 8, deals with this issue in only nine articles. Intensified
ocean use coupled with increasing coastal state worries over pollution, espionage, and
resources led some states to call for a more explicit definition of the rights and duties
of coastal and maritime states. Stevenson & Oxman, The Preparations for the Law of
the Sea Conference, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 10 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Stevenson &
Oxman].
44. RSNT, supra note 21, art. 19; CTS, supra note 8, art. 14(6).
45. Military aircraft and those engaged in regularly scheduled transport have no
right of overflight but must secure coastal state permission to enter territorial waters.
Other civil aircraft do have the right of overflight. Convention on International Civil
Aviation, Arts. 2, 3, 5, 6, opened for signature Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, T.I.A.S. No.
1591, 15 U.N.T.S. 295.
46. RSNT, supra note 21, art. 18; CTS, supra note 8, art. 14(4).
47. RSNT, supra note 21, art. 24; CTS, supra note 8, art. 16(3).
48. RSNT, supra note 21, arts. 26, 27; CTS, supra note 8, art. 20.
49. CTS, supra note 8, art. 14(5).
50. Id. art. 14.
51. Stevenson & Oxman, supra note 43, at 10.
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threat or use of force against the coastal state; weapons prac-
tice; espionage; any acts of propaganda aimed at affecting the
defense or security of the coastal state; the launching or land-
ing of any aircraft or military device; embarking or disembark-
ing any commodity, currency, or person contrary to the cus-
toms, fiscal, immigration or sanitary regulations of the coastal
state; willful and serious pollution contrary to the proposed
treaty; scientific and survey activities; and "any other activity
not having a direct bearing on passage."52
The last clause gives the coastal state a degree of discre-
tion to interfere with navigation. Nevertheless, the emphasis in
the RSNT that certain activities undertaken during transit
constitute non-innocent passage, provides a substantial im-
provement over the ambiguity of the CTS. The latter could be
interpreted as allowing states to assert that entry into terri-
torial waters-that is, passage itself-would be prejudicial to
the peace, good order or security of the state. Some coastal
states have interpreted the language of the 1958 CTS as per-
mitting them to selectively control passage on the basis of flag
or destination or the character of the ship or cargo. 3 Control-
ling passage based on these criteria would be contrary to the
intent of the RSNT because, in addition to the focus on ship
activity during transit, discussed above, the text expressly de-
nies the coastal state any right to "discriminate in form or in
fact against the ships of any state or against ships carrying
cargoes to, from or on behalf of any state."54 Furthermore, arti-
cle 20(2) prevents coastal state regulation of "design, construc-
tion, manning or equipment of foreign ships or matters regu-
lated by generally accepted international rules . ... 5
The present text reflects the competing interests being
pressed during the negotiations. Coastal interests are expressly
protected, while the essential right of access receives a two-fold
reassurance. By stressing that activity during transit is the
issue rather than access, and that discrimination against flag,
52. RSNT, supra note 21, art. 18(2).
53. Stevenson & Oxman, supra note 43, at 43. While this allegation is very often
made, the authors could find no concrete examples of actual coastal state abuse of
discretion. The fear is largely prospective. Under the CTS, coastal states could abuse
shipping. See A. HOLLICK & R. OSGOOD, NEW ERA OF OCEAN POLITICS 103 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as HOLLICK & OSGOOD].
54. RSNT, supra note 21, arts. 23(1), (2).
55. In light of recent accidents involving oil tankers, more attention may be given
to this provision at the sixth session.
[Vol. 17
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cargoes, or design cannot be exercised, the RSNT reduces the
opportunity for politically motivated interference. Hence, the
protection of passage that is innocent is generally greater for all
nations under the RSNT than under the CTS.56
Straits and the right of transit passage. With the tradi-
tional three-mile wide territorial sea, most important straits7
contain a corridor of high seas waters" where all nations can
exercise the usual high seas rights of surface transit, overflight
and submerged passage. 5 The RSNT, however, extends coastal
state territorial jurisdiction to twelve miles, bringing over one
hundred straits, many of crucial importance,60 under the re-
gime of territorial seas and, therefore, innocent passage. In the
view of many maritime states, although innocent passage
would be acceptable for territorial sea passage in general, its
restrictions"1 and its grant of discretion to coastal states to
declare certain passage non-innocent" would not provide an
adequate guarantee of free movement through these crucial
straits. 3
56. Although the vague reference to passage which "prejudices the peace, good
order or security" in article 18(1) from the CTS, a tribunal should interpret this in light
of the activity-oriented example of article 18 (2), see text accompanying note 52 supra,
and the prohibition on discrimination in article 23.
57. Straits have been variously defined as: "an area of the sea, a narrow sea
channel which separates two adjacent land masses or connects two different water
bodies," Hodgson & McIntyre, Maritime Commerce in Selected Areas of High
Concentration, in HAZARDS OF MARITIME TRANSIT 9 (T. Clingon & L. Alexander eds.
1973) [hereinafter cited as Hodgson & McIntyre]; "a narrow passage of water joining
two larger bodies of water," KNIGHT, supra note 1, at 347; "a connection of the sea
between two territories, being of a certain limited width and connecting two seas
otherwise separated .... ," Hodgson & McIntyre, supra at 9. Although it is clear that
there are limitations on the width of areas which will be considered straits, no precise
standard has been established. The range of recognized international straits currently
varies from less than one nautical mile to 105 miles. See KNIGHT, supra note 1, Annex
I at I-1.
58. Most important straits are wider than six miles. See KNIGHT, supra note 1,
Annex I.
59. CHS, supra note 8, art. 2.
60. See Hodgson & McIntyre, supra note 57, at 10-17; KNIGHT, supra note 1,
Annex I.
61. These include restrictions on overflight and submerged passage. See text
accompanying note 41 supra and following.
62. The grant of discretion to coastal states is especially broad under article 16(4)
of the CTS, which states that innocent passage in straits shall not be suspended. This
clearly implies that non-innocent passage can be suspended, thereby incorporating
into straits passage the full measure of discretion which coastal states exercise over
passage through their territorial sea.
63. The United States originally supported protection of high seas navigational
rights in straits in exchange for recognition of a twelve mile territorial zone. NEW
DIRECTIONS, supra note 13, at 162-63. A Soviet proposal would have added: "No State
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In an attempt to meet the need for transit through straits
free of the restrictions of innocent passage, the RSNT creates
a new type of passage applicable only to these straits, called
transit passage. 4 Transit passage is:
the exercise in accordance with this Chapter of the free-
dom of navigation and overflight solely for the purpose of
continuous and expeditious transit of the strait between
one area of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and
another area of the high seas or an exclusive economic
zone. 
5
As discussed below, the RSNT accords the right of transit pas-
sage to ships which navigate these straits for the purpose of
transit so long as the on-ship activity incidental to passage is
consistent with the purpose of transit. In return for the right
of transit passage, maritime states are subject to the good faith
of coastal states who are granted the discretion to determine
the character of on-ship activity incident to passage, as well as
the power to regulate passage undertaken for purposes other
than transit. Also, coastal states are granted rights to establish
new sea lanes through the straits, so long as they are consistent
with international norms, as well as the right to enact laws
proscribing specific types of conduct, provided they also are
consistent with international norms.
While the basic aspects of transit passage are clear, it ap-
pears that serious interpretive problems will arise from the
textual lacunae and linguistic vagueness used to achieve a bal-
ance between the interests of coastal states in preserving the
integrity of their territorial waters and the interests of mari-
time states in unrestricted navigation. The boundaries of ac-
ceptable behavior during passage are not clearly defined, nor
is the scope of enforcement authority for violations of interna-
tional norms.
Maritime passage, for purposes other than continuous and
expeditious transit is clearly not protected under this section."
shall be entitled to interrupt or suspend the transit of ships through straits, or engage
therein in any acts which interfere with the transit of ships, or require ships in transit
to stop or communicate information of any kind." This provision was not adopted.
Draft Articles on Straits Used for Internation Navigation, art. l(e), U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 62/C. 2/L.11 (1974), reprinted in CARACAS DOCUMENTS, supra note 14, at 92
(Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Poland joined with the Soviet Union
in submitting the proposal).
64. RSNT, supra note 21, arts. 36-42.
65. Id. art. 37(2) (emphasis added).
66. See text accompanying note 65 supra for full text of this provision.
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Thus, marine research, mineral exploration and resource ex-
ploitation in international straits are not protected by transit
passage. Since most important straits will lose a high seas cor-
ridor under the RSNT, transit passage represents those few
aspects of the high seas regime which maritime states sought
to maintain such as submerged transit, overflight, and unre-
stricted access. To lose the right of transit passage is to lose the
guarantee of uninterrupted passage. The rights conferred upon
the international community to navigate international straits
thus apply for the sole purpose of "continuous and expeditious
transit."
The boundaries of acceptable behavior during passage, at
first reading appear to favor navigational freedom, guarantee-
ing the rights of submerged transit,67 overflight" and access."
But a closer analysis reveals that coastal states retain a large
measure of discretion to determine whether activity is "inci-
dent to" passage, and, therefore, within the protection guaran-
teed to those engaged in "transit passage."70
Therefore, characterization by coastal states of incidental
on-ship activity during passage is another problem which may
cause the loss of transit passage. Even during otherwise permis-
sible continuous and expeditious transit, a vessel could con-
ceivably discharge waste, undertake research, or launch mili-
tary aircraft.7 The question is whether these incidental activi-
ties violate the right of transit passage. Article 38(1)(c) ad-
dresses this question: "Ships and aircraft . . . shall: Refrain
from any activities other than those incident to their normal
modes of continuous and expeditious transit unless rendered
necessary by force majeure or by distress."72 It is unclear
67. Article 37(1) guarantees to "all ships" the right of transit passage without
restriction as to the mode of transit.
68. RSNT, supra note 21, art. 37(1).
69. Article 42 prohibits coastal states from suspending the right of transit pas-
sage through straits used for international navigation. While article 14 of the CTS
prevents the suspension of innocent passage through straits used for international
navigation, this implies that non-innocent passage can be suspended. As the concept
of innocent passage is, in the opinion of maritime powers, too vague, coastal state
discretion to harrass traffic in straits exists as a constant possibility. See Nolta,
Passage through Straits: Free or Innocent? The Interests at Stake, 11 S.D.L. REV. 815
(1974).
70. See, e.g., note 71 infra.
71. "In the South Pacific and the Caribbean, the use of helicopters during the
transit of certain straits by deep-draft vessels is useful for such navigational purposes
as screening for opposed exits from the strait." HOLLICK & OSGOOD, supra note 53, at
105. Indonesia has complained of the use of such aircraft in local straits.
72. Emphasis added. Note the similarity of this to the prohibition on activity
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whether the characterization of activities as incident to naviga-
tion is within coastal state discretion, but if so, the right of
transit passage is tenuous indeed. The right is subject to loss
if passage is not continous and expeditious or if any on-ship
activity is not incident to otherwise acceptable passage.
The vagueness of the transit passage provisions causes a
further problem regarding the enforcement of international
norms. Some internationalization of straits has occurred in the
RSNT. Coastal states are allowed to establish sea lanes to pro-
mote the safe passage of ships only with the approval of an
international authority." Laws regarding discharge of oil, oily
wastes, and other noxious substances in the straits may be
enacted only in conformity with "applicable international
standards."7 Beyond these, the coastal state may enact laws
only regarding prevention of fishing, and violation of customs,
fiscal, immigration or sanitary regulations." While strait states
presumably have the power to enforce the latter class of laws
so long as violations occur within their jurisdictions,"5 the text
is silent as to who has the authority to enforce the former class
of laws regarding the discharge of oil, oily wastes, and other
noxious substances into the straits. If authority is not implicit
in the RSNT, strait states may have to look to other treaties
for authority to enforce international norms.
While the scope of state authority to enforce international
norms is unclear, it is clear that strait states have the authority
to enforce violations of transit passage. As provided in article
37(3), "any activity which is not an exercise of the right of
transit passage through a strait remains subject to the other
applicable provisions of the present Convention." Since every
activity not incident to transit would necessarily not be an
exercise of the right of transit passage, every such activity falls
during innocent passage in article 18(2)(1) where "[any . ..activity not having a
direct bearing on passage" is considered non-innocent. "Direct bearing" does appear
to be a higher standard.
73. RSNT, supra note 21, arts. 39(4), 39(5). Article 39 is currently under attack
by strait states.
74. Id. art. 40(6).
75. Id. art. 40. In this regard, article 40(2) limits coastal state jurisdiction further
by providing that "[sluch laws and regulations shall not discriminate in form or fact
amongst foreign ships, nor in their application have the practical effect of denying,
hampering or impairing the right of transit passage as defined in this section."
76. Article 41 can be interpreted as authorizing coastal state enforcement:
"[Floreign ships exercising the right of transit shall comply with such laws and
regulations of the coastal state." See W. BURKE, CONTEMPORARY LAW OF THE SEA:
TRANSPORTATION, COMMUNICATION AND FLIGHT 27 (1975) [hereinafter cited as BURKEI.
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under other relevant provisions of the Convention. By this
means, activities outside the scope of transit passage such as
marine research, mineral exploration and resource exploita-
tion, would either be governed by provisions of the territorial
sea and innocent passage or by those governing the exclusive
economic zone, depending upon the width of the strait." Thus,
the protection afforded by transit passage applies only insofar
as the transiting vessel strictly adheres to the standards of the
text respecting activities incident to continuous and expedi-
tious navigation. Nearly every violation of the right of transit
passage would also constitute a violation of the provisions on
innocent passage.7"
Article 24(1), taken with article 37(3), appears to grant to
strait states precisely the same enforcement powers they enjoy
in the territorial sea. However, there remain some differences
between the regime of straits and that of the territorial sea. As
noted above, overflight and submerged passage cannot be pro-
hibited by strait states, nor can those states enact laws which
would impair transit or impose regulations stricter than inter-
national standards regarding pollution control, vessel design,
or sea lanes. States do have these powers over their territorial
sea.
In sum, transit passage through straits, as conceived in the
RSNT, grants the rights of both submerged passage and over-
flight, so important to major naval powers. However, the pro-
tection of transit passage is afforded vessels only for acts inci-
dent to passage. A coastal state perceiving on-ship activity not,
in its opinion, incident to transit, is accorded the full powers
available to it under the regime of innocent passage. From the
perspective of merchant vessels, then, this new regime is little
more than a mildly relaxed innocent passage regime.79 Transit
77. Although the right of transit passage was primarily drafted because of mari-
time states' fears over extension of the territorial sea regime to 12 miles, the provisions
regarding transit passage are not limited to straits of less than 24 miles breadth. Article
36 states that the sections apply "to straits which are used for international navigation
between one area of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another area of
high seas or an exclusive economic zone." Thus, it seems that states whose economic
zones fall partly within international straits must exercise their rights in the straits
subject to this chapter. This is further supported by article 48(7) which clearly recog-
nizes the primacy of essential sea lanes over the erection of artificial structures.
78. Compare the provisions of article 18 regarding the meaning of innocent pas-
sage with articles 38-41 dealing with: the duties of ships and aircraft during passage;
sea lanes; regulations by strait states; and navigation and safety aids.
79. Compare the "incident to" provision of transit passage with the "direct bear-
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passage is certainly not a high seas regime, nor has coastal state
discretion been greatly reduced. As long, however, as transiting
vessels strictly observe the prohibition on undertaking "any
activity not incident to passage" and coastal states act in good
faith, the regime should adequately protect the interests of
both coastal and navigation states.
Contiguous Zone
The RSNT maintains a zone established by the First Law
of the Sea Conference in 1958, the contiguous zone. The RSNT,
however, doubles the breadth of this zone."0 Article 32 provides
that the contiguous zone is contiguous to the territorial sea and
may extend no more than twenty-four nautical miles from the
baseline used to establish the breadth of the territorial sea. A
coastal state has the authority to control activities in this zone
to prevent the infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration,
or sanitary regulations in its territorial sea. Since maritime
states have lived with the concept for almost twenty years, the
contiguous zone was not a highly controversial topic at the
Third Law of the Sea Conference.
Archipelagic Waters
Prior to the RSNT no special rules pertaining to the
coastal jurisdiction of archipelagic states"' achieved general
recognition. At both the 1958 and 1960 Law of the Sea Confer-
ences, mid-ocean archipelagic states such as Indonesia and the
Philippines proposed special regimes governing waters within
lines drawn around archipelagoes, although in both cases the
Conferences failed to enact those proposals. 2 Since the Second
Conference, some archipelagic states have made unilateral pro-
ing" provision of innocent passage (art. 18(2)), discussed at text accompanying note
52 supra.
80. See note 17 supra.
81. The geographical definition of an archipelago is "a formation of two or more
islands (islets or rocks) which geographically may be considered as a whole." Amera-
singhe, The Problem of Archipelagoes in the International Law of the Sea, 23 INT'L &
CoMp. L.Q. 539 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Amerasinghe]. Article 118(a) of the RSNT
vaguely defines an archipelagic state as one "constituted wholly by one or more archi-
pelagoes [whichi may include other islands." Article 118(b) defines an archipelago
as "a group of islands, including parts of islands, inter-connecting waters and other
natural features which are so closely interrelated that such islands, waters and other
natural features form an intrinsic geographical, economic and political entity, or which
historically have been regarded as such."
82. See BURKE, supra note 76, at 5-8.
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clamations enclosing the waters within archipelagoes," . but
these claims have been resisted by maritime states.
In 1973, Fiji, Maritius, Indonesia and the Philippines
authored declarations of principles governing archipelagic
states 4 which evolved into a single set of proposed articles con-
cerning the respective rights of archipelagic states and mari-
time countries.8" This proposal and one drafted by the United
Kingdom" were considered at the Caracas session of the Third
Conference.
Based on the two proposals, negotiations at the Conference
produced general agreement that there should be special provi-
sions governing archipelagic states and that these new rules
should protect existing navigational interests. 7 The RSNT bal-
ances both sets of interests in the creation of a new region:
archipelagic waters."5 Within this region ships 9 enjoy the right
of innocent passage" through enclosed archipelagic waters
which are not designated or traditional sea lanes,' and the
right of "archipelagic sea lanes passage" (virtually identical to
transit passage) through designated and traditional sea lanes.2
83. Ecuador has treated the Galapagos as a unit, with the longest baseline be-
tween the islands being 147 miles. Both Indonesia and the Philippines make similar
claims. Amerasinghe, supra note 81, at 544. See U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 19/5/Add. 1
(1960) and [1956] Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 69. In regard to Indonesia, the original
government claim, made in December, 1957, provided that "all waters surrounding,
between and linking the islands belonging to the State of Indonesia . . . constitute
natural parts of island or national waters under the absolute jurisdiction of the State
of Indonesia." 8 EMBASSY OF INDONESIA, REPORT ON INDONESIA (Nov. 1957-Jan. 1958).
84. 28 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 21) (vol. V) 1, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 138/SC. II/L.
15, and 28 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 21) (vol. III) 102-05, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 138/SC. IM'L.
48 (1973).
85. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/C. 2/L. 49 (1974), reprinted in CARACAS DOCUMENTS,
supra note 14, at 163.
86. 28 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 21) (vol. III), U.N. Doc. A/AC. 138/SC. II/L. 44
(1973).
87. These special provisions should protect existing navigational interests in, for
example, the traditional lanes through Indonesia and the Philippines.
88. These are waters within baselines drawn, according to article 119, from "the
outermost points of the outermost islands and drying reefs of the archipelago," with
some limitations on the ratio of water enclosed to the land masses. Article 122 permits
the archipelagic state to draw closing lines within the archipelagic waters for purposes
of delimiting its internal waters, making clear that archipelagic waters are a different
regime. Nor are such waters to be considered territorial sea, as this is distinguished
from archipelagic waters in article 120.
89. RSNT, supra note 21, art. 124(1). While warships are included, aircraft are
not.
90. Id. art. 124. But see id. arts. 125(1), 125(9).
91. Id. arts. 124, 125. A similar right pertains in the regime of the territorial sea.
See text accompanying note 42 supra.
92. See text accompanying note 57 supra for a discussion of transit passage. See
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
The regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage applies to
navigation through areas designated by archipelagic states as
sea lanes or through the routes normally used for international
navigation should the archipelagic state choose not to create
special lanes.93 Articles 124 and 125 make it clear that in these
areas the general rule of innocent passage is not applicable, 4
and that the right to use traditional lanes is not contingent
upon the permission of archipelagic states in the event of non-
designation. 5 Hence, the international community, in ex-
change for recognition of archipelagic waters, has received the
right of international passage through the enclosed waters, not
contingent upon an archipelagic state's permission.
Most of the provisions regarding archipelagic sea lanes
passage are identical to those governing transit passage
through straits." In both cases the states' proposals for the
establishment of new sea lanes must be submitted to "the com-
petent international organisation" for adoption. The organiza-
tion may prescribe only lanes agreed upon by the states." An
additional provision, crucial from the perspective of interna-
tional navigation, defines the rights and duties of archipelagic
and maritime states in sea lanes passage by incorporating arti-
cles 38, 40 and 41, dealing with the rights and duties of transit
passage." The result is that the relations of coastal state and
transiting ships in archipelagic sea lanes are the same as in
international straits.
High Seas
Rules governing navigation on the high seas" have tradi-
tionally included exclusive flag state jurisdiction over vessel
BURKE, supra note 76, at 5.
93. Designated lanes must include traditional sea lanes used for international
navigation. RSNT, supra note 21, art. 125(4).
94. Article 124 provides that the right of innocent passage is "subject to" article
125 which deals with the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage.
95. "If an archipelagic State does not designate sea lanes or air routes, the right
of archipelagic sea lanes passage may be exercised through the routes normally used
for international navigation." RSNT, supra note 21, art. 125(12).
96. Compare id. art. 39(1) with id. art. 125(6). Compare also id. art. 39(6) with
id. art. 125(10).
97. Compare id. art. 39(4) with id. art. 125(9).
98. Id. art. 126.
99. Article 75 defines "high seas" as all the parts of the sea that are not included
in an exclusive economic zone, discussed infra at text accompanying note 108 and
following, or internal, territorial, or archipelagic waters.
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conduct,00 as well as a right of unrestricted access and use,
including navigation and fishing,'"' for all nations."2 Article 80
maintains the tradition of flag state jurisdiction; "Ships shall
sail under the flag of one state only and, save in exceptional
cases expressly provided for in international treaties or in the
present convention,'"3 shall be subject to its exclusive jurisdic-
tion on the high seas."' "' Article 76 continues the basic right of
unrestricted access.
The high seas is the area which affords the greatest free-
dom to maritime states. However, the RSNT substantially re-
duces the amount of ocean surface which presently has the
status of high seas. As mentioned above, over one hundred
straits which contain a high seas corridor under a three mile
territorial sea regime will be subject to the provisions of terri-
torial waters and transit passage under the RSNT.1'0 While the
loss of high seas status for strategic straits is important, the
high seas zone will lose a much greater ocean surface area to
the exclusive economic zone.'0 6 Under the RSNT, the exclusive
economic zone contains approximately thirty-six percent of the
ocean's surface. 0 7
A NEW MARITIME ORDER-THE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE
Disagreement over the breadth of territorial seas has in-
creased since World War IP0 in part due to a perception by the
developing coastal states that their land resources are exhausti-
ble, their populations are expanding, and high seas freedom of
fishing provides no protection from over-exploitation by the
100. McDoUGAL & BURKE, supra note 1, at 798. See also RSNT, supra note 21,
art. 76.
101. CHS, supra note 8, art. 2.
102. RSNT, supra note 21, art. 76(1). See generally Bissell, Intervention on the
High Seas: An American Approach Employing Community Standards, 7 J. MAR. L.
& COM. 718 (1975).
103. These "cases" are relatively limited: for example, suppression of piracy (art.
93); suppression of unauthorized broadcasting (art. 97); and prohibition of slave trade
(art. 87).
104. This is verbatim from the CHS, supra note 8.
105. See text accompanying note 60 supra.
106. RSNT, supra note 21, arts. 46, 75.
107. Alexander, The Extended Economic Zone and U.S. Ocean Interests, 10
COLUM. J. WORLD Bus. 34, 35 (1975).
108. McNees, Freedom of Transit Through International Straits, 6 J. MAR. L. &
COM. 175, 181 (1975): "At the beginning of the 20th century, twenty of twenty-one
states which claimed or acknowledged a territorial sea at that time had adopted the
three-mile limit or acknowledged it as being the law." See also note 3 supra.
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fleets of developed nations.'09 To protect their interests, coastal
state jurisdiction has been unilaterally extended, initially by
Latin American states, to areas traditionally considered high
seas. The label given by each country to these extended zones
has varied from "Patrimonial Sea" to "Exclusive Economic
Zone.""' 9 To accommodate these interests, the RSNT creates
the exclusive economic zone which extends 200 miles from the
baseline of a coastal state. However one labels them, the exten-
sion of coastal state jurisdiction over new zones adjacent to
their coasts marks "an irreversible trend towards a new legal
order for the oceans.""'
Definition and Development
An economic zone is an area adjacent to the territorial sea
where a state exercises jurisdiction over resource exploita-
tion." Difficulties arise in drafting a formula that both fairly
and adequately establishes coastal state jurisdiction over re-
sources while protecting other international uses of the zone. 13
Despite intense debate and negotiations at the fifth session of
the Conference, the question of the juridical status of the zone
and the rights enjoyed by all states within it were not solved
and remain among the most difficult questions facing the Con-
ference."'
109. See, e.g., Declaration of Santo Domingo, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 156/80 (1972),
reprinted in KNIGHT, supra note 1, at 742; Kampala Declaration, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.
62/23 (1974), reprinted in CARACAS DOCUMENTS, supra note 14, at 1; OAU Declaration,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/33 (1974), reprinted in CARACAS DOCUMENTS, supra note 14, at
2.
110. Brown, Maritime Zones: A Survey of Claims, in NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note
13, at 165-67.
111. Mr. Marotta Rangel (Brazil), II OFFICIAL RECORDS, THIRD UNITED NATIONS
CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, 202, U.N. Sales No. E. 75 v. 4 [hereinafter cited
as OFFICIAL RECORDS]. Coastal claims vary from 12 to 200 miles. See Brown, Maritime
Zones: A Survey of Claims, in NEw DIRECTIONS, supra note 13, at 166-67. Mr. Rangel
is correct. Mexico has also created an economic zone. See XV INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS
380 (1976). During the last session India was reportedly considering similar legislation.
Developed countries, which had withheld recognizing claims to economic zones as a
basis for negotiating on other issues, succumbed to the trend. The European Economic
Community announced it would enact legislation creating a 200 mile zone. San Fran-
cisco Examiner, Sept. 23, 1976, at 12, col. 5. The United States has also extended its
jurisdiction to 200 miles. Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L.
No. 94-265, 90 Stat. 331 (codified at 16 U.S.C.A. § 1801 (West Supp. 1977)).
112. Under RSNT, article 45, this is an area not to "extend beyond 200 nautical
miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured."
113. These international uses are primarily navigation, communications, tradi-
tional fishing rights, and, to a lesser extent, national defense.
114. "Unfortunately, I cannot say that the meetings of that group [dealing with
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The impasse at the Conference results from two different
concepts as to the status of the zone. Maritime states argue
that the zone should retain its traditional high seas status,
subject to coastal state jurisdiction over economic resources. As
such, all other uses would belong to the international com-
munity as of right. An analogy to property law suggests that
maritime states wish to see "title" to the zone remain with the
international community, subject to easements for the benefit
of coastal states. Regarding unallocated or unforeseen uses of
the zone, the international community would enjoy a prima
facie right superior to coastal claims of jurisdiction, as tradi-
tionally every nation had a right to engage in whatever activi-
ties the high seas might allow." 5 The result of such a regime
would be that any coastal state claim to exclusive jurisdiction
would be an exception to the prevailing regime and the state
seeking such jurisdiction would bear the burden of proving the
validity of its claim."'
In contrast to this proposal, coastal states adopt two posi-
tions. More extremist delegations claim that the economic zone
should be included within the territorial sea, that is, title to the
zone should reside in coastal states subject to easements which
they might grant to maritime states. The more moderate ma-
jority argue for treating the zone as sui generis:17 that is, a new
regime within the legal order of the oceans. Under this formula-
tion, the zone is neither territorial because of the unreasonable
restrictions that that status would place upon navigation, nor
is it high seas since the absolute freedoms characteristic of
that regime are incompatible with the restrictions necessarily
imposed to manage resource exploitation. A zone sui generis
represents a compromise between the advocates of high seas
the zone's status] achieved practical results. I should like to state, however, that the
group was very close to reaching a generally acceptable solution." Report of Mr. Andres
Aguilar, Chairman of the Second Committee at the Fifth Session of the Conference,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/L. 17 (1976), reprinted in OFFICE OF THE LAW OF THE SEA
NEGOTIATIONS, THIRD UNITED NATION'S CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA: REPORTS
OF COMMI'rEE CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE II at 5 (1976).
115. CHS, supra note 8, art. 2.
116. Despite strenuous efforts by maritime states, this regime was not adopted
at the conference. The United States is especially unhappy over this failure. "The U.S.
made clear that the provisions of the RSNT on this subject are unacceptable as written
and that we cannot agree to any text which makes it clear that the zone is not high
seas. On the contrary, the text must somehow explicitly accord high seas status to the
zone." U.S. Delegation Report, supra note 27, at 10.
117. Chairman Aguilar seems to hold this majority view. RSNT, supra note 21,
Committee II Chairman's Note, at 4.
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status and those proposing an extended territorial sea.
The RSNT reflects the compromise position: it creates a
zone which allocates the rights and duties of coastal states, the
rights and duties of the international community, and defines
the zone for purposes of settling disputes over unallocated or
unforeseen uses."' An analogy to property law suggests that
uses of the zone are allocated between the maritime and coastal
states in the same way that land may be divided into surface
uses such as agriculture, sub-surface uses such as mining, and
above-surface uses such as aircraft flight lanes.
Residual Rights
It is in the RSNT treatment of unallocated rights and
unforeseen uses that the equitable balance achieved in the text
can best be demonstrated. Residual rights involves the compe-
tence of states to undertake activities not dealt with explicitly
by the treaty. As noted above, in the high seas the international
community is granted the right to enjoy all uses the sea might
provide, whether foreseen or unforeseen. No state may claim an
exclusive right therein." 9 In contrast, the principle of the terri-
torial sea involves granting sovereignty to the coastal state over
all foreseen and unforeseen uses within the zone. 20 In the exclu-
sive economic zone, however, a balance is struck between
coastal state sovereignty and the international community's
right of use.
The underlying principle guiding the allocation of residual
or unforeseen uses within the economic zone is neither high
seas freedom nor territorial sea sovereignty, but that of eq-
uity. '2 Under the regime of the economic zone there is no pre-
sumptive vesting of residual rights to either the coastal state
or the international community. Rather, allocations of rights
and jurisdiction within the zone, where not explicitly dealt
with under the treaty, are to be made on a case by case basis.
In recognition that the zone is to be shared and extensively
used by sovereign states, the treaty permits each to use the
zone to the fullest extent, while requiring that account be taken
118. Article 44 defines coastal rights, article 46 defines other states' rights, and
article 47 defines the zone for purposes of settling disputes over unallocated and unfore-
seen uses.
119. CHS, supra note 8, art. 2.
120. CTS, supra note 8, art. 1.
121. RSNT, supra note 21, art. 47.
[Vol. 17
FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION
of the competing interests of other users. This is the "co-
operative zonal regime" sought by delegates uncomfortable
with the traditional lack of legal order on the high seas.'22
While the RSNT speaks in terms of "sovereign rights and
jurisdiction"'23 the sovereignty is in no sense unlimited compe-
tence or plenary jurisdiction. States are required by the text to
exercise their rights in conformity with the regime of the eco-
nomic zone and that regime is explicitly one of "due respect"'24
for the interests of all user states. Thus, "in the economic zone,
the coastal state would exercise sovereign rights over its re-
sources but not over the zone itself, and must take into consid-
eration the rights of other States ....
In principle, then, equity rules the exclusive economic
zone. It should be noted that article 47 applies to "cases where
the present convention does not attribute rights or jurisdic-
tion." The delegates, however, have undertaken to attribute
many rights and duties within the zone, presumably in con-
formity with the principles expressed in article 47: "in the light
of all relevant circumstances, taking into account the respec-
tive importance of the interest involved to the parties as well
as the international community as a whole." A reading of the
rights and duties allocated within the treaty may indicate a
less than perfect adherence to this principle, but certainly in
the case of any dispute arising over competing uses, the consid-
erations articulated in article 47 would provide the basis for
settlement by a tribunal.
Allocated Rights: Navigation and Coastal Authority over
Resources
Certain rights and duties have been allocated in the exclu-
sive economic zone regarding the navigational rights of mari-
time states and the coastal states' sovereign rights of resource
exploitation and management (including pollution control). It
122. See, e.g., Statement of M. Templeton (N.Z.), OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note
111, at 170.
123. RSNT, supra note 21, art. 44.
124. Article 47 provides guidance as to the mutual duty of "due respect" imposed
on all states. See text following note 144 infra.
The concept of "due respect" can be analogized to the concept of nuisance in
property law. Essentially, due respect requires coastal states to exercise their rights in
a manner which will not unreasonably interfere with the use and enjoyment of the
legitimate interests of other user states.
125. Mr. Castaneda (Mexico), OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 111, at 173.
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is important to assess whether the balance achieved by the
Conference has subordinated navigational freedoms to the sov-
ereign rights of coastal states. It must be noted at the outset
that article 76 of the RSNT which defines traditional high seas
freedom such as fishing and access to minerals, does not apply
to the economic zone'26 because article 75 excludes the eco-
nomic zone from the areas in which the high seas regime ap-
plies. Other articles concerning various rights and duties in the
high seas, including exclusive flag state jurisdiction, are incor-
porated into the zone only, "insofar as they are not incompati-
ble with this Chapter."' 27 Thus, the economic zone, while
clearly not high seas, incorporates some high seas attributes to
the extent that they do not alter the concept of the economic
zone. However, to insure coastal state rights to develop re-
sources and protect the marine environment, the high seas
right of all nations to exploit the area no longer exists. Exclu-
sive flag state jurisdiction may suffer some corresponding re-
striction.
126. RSNT, supra note 21, art. 76 (freedom of the high seas):
1. The high seas are open to all States, whether coastal or land-
locked. Accordingly, no State may validly purport to subject any part of
them to its sovereignty. Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the
conditions laid down by the present Convention and by other rules of
international law. It comprises, inter alia, both for coastal and land-
locked States:
(a) Freedom of navigation;
(b) Freedom of overflight;
(c) Freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines, subject to
Chapter IV [regarding the continental shelf];
(d) Freedom to construct artificial islands and other installations
permitted under international law, subject to Chapter IV;
(e) Freedom of fishing, subject to the conditions laid down in sec-
tion 2 [regarding management and conservation of the living resources
of the high seas];
(f) Freedom of scientific research, subject to Chapters IV and...
[marine scientific research].
2. These freedoms shall be exercised by all States, with due consid-
eration for the interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of
the high seas, and also with due consideration for the rights under the
present Convention with respect to activities in the International Area.
127. RSNT, supra note 21, art. 46(2). The flag state of a vessel thus retains
exclusive jurisdiction over it under article 80 to the extent that it is not incompatible
with the provisions governing the economic zone. Note the provisions of the Vienna
Treaty on Treaties: "When a treaty specifies that it is subject to, or that it is not to
be considered as incompatible with, an earlier or later treaty, the provisions of that
other treaty prevail." Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 30(2), done May
23, 1969, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27, reprinted in T. ELIAs, THE MODERN LAW OF
TREATIES 225 (1974).
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Navigation. Freedom of navigation and communication
are made "subject to the relevant provisions of the present
Convention" under article 46:
1. In the exclusive economic zone, all States,
whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy subject to the rele-
vant provisions of the present Convention, the freedoms of
navigation and overflight and of the laying of submarine
cables and pipelines and other internationally lawful uses
of the sea related to navigation and communication.
2. Articles 77 to 103 [regarding the high seas] and
other pertinent rules of international law apply to the ex-
clusive economic zone in so far as they are not incompati-
ble with this Chapter.
3. In exercising their rights and performing their
duties under the present Convention in the exclusive eco-
nomic zone, States shall have due regard to the rights and
duties of the coast State and shall comply with the laws
and regulations enacted by the coastal State in conformity
with this Chapter and other rules of international law.
The degree of interference resulting from this provision will
depend upon the quantity and quality of the provisions that
these freedoms are "subject to." Unreasonably broad grants of
coastal state jurisdiction could reduce navigational freedom to
nonexistence.
A consideration of the origin of the "subject to" article is
useful to determine the potential for interference resulting from
this clause. Conference Committee II, responsible for develop-
ing Part II of the RSNT, turned down a proposal making
coastal exploitation "subject to" a high seas zone,'28 as well as
a "sui generis" draft which placed the burden of proof upon
the coastal state for justifying an interference with naviga-
tion. ' 9 Conversely, a proposed article making navigation
"subject to the exercise by the coastal State of its rights within
the area" was not incorporated either.'30 The provision finally
128. See U.S. Draft Articles, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/C.2/L. 47, art. 1 (1974),
reprinted in CARACAS DOCUMENTS, supra note 14, at 155, 156, which states that "the
exercise of these provisions [coastal rights] shall be in conformity with and subject
to the provisions of this Convention."
129. "A coastal state, in its exclusive economic zone, is under an international
duty not to interfere without reasonable justification with . . . freedom of navigation."
Nigeria, Draft Article, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/C.2/L.21/Rev. 1, art. 3 (1974), reprinted
in CARACAS DOCUMENTS, supra note 14, at 111, 112.
130. Canada, Chile, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Mauritius, Mexico, New Zealand
and Norway, Working Paper, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/L. 4, art. 14 (1974), reprinted in
CARACAs DOCUMENTS, supra note 14, at 7, 8.
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negotiated makes navigation subject to the convention rather
than to coastal rights. The difference is that it tempers the
tradition of high seas freedom not with unlimited coastal state
expansion of rights, but with the balance set out in the RSNT.
Navigation is exercised subject to all the articles in the RSNT,
and, significantly, no express declaration that navigation is
"subject to" the coastal right to exploit and conserve the zone
exists in the text. Rather, the text imposes a duty upon both
parties to exercise "due regard" for the rights of other states.",
Coastal state rights are tempered by the requirement of due
regard and the "sui generis" regime of the zone, as are the
rights of navigation and communication.
While the choice of language creating the right of naviga-
tion is a source of concern, particularly the "subject to" clause
in 46(1), the provisions to which it is subject are, on the whole,
balanced and consistent with the necessity for mutual consid-
eration in a geographical zone where simultaneous activities
are often undertaken by different sovereign entities. Clearly,
some formula must be adopted that imposes a duty to compro-
mise on the part of these sovereign entities. A high seas regime
would perhaps strengthen freedom of navigation, but a duty to
defer to certain coastal activities would remain essential.'32 As
it is now, no provisions exist in the text clearly subjecting one
interest to another.
The parameters of sovereign rights. While the economic
zone provisions require coastal states to give due regard to the
navigational rights of maritime states, the RSNT grants
"sovereign rights" to coastal states over resources within the
zone which were traditionally available to all nations.'33 The
grant of sovereign rights does not affect the status of non-living
resources on the surface or sub-surface of the continental shelf
nor of living sedentary resources attached to it, since these have
been governed by coastal states under earlier treaties.'34 Be-
yond this, the RSNT represents an expression of present
coastal state claims to resource jurisdiction well beyond the
131. RSNT, supra note 21, arts. 44(2), 46(3).
132. Warbrick, The Regulations of Navigation, in NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note
13, at 144.
133. CHS, supra note 8, art. 2.
134. The acquisition began with the Truman Declaration of 1945, Pres. Proc. No.
2667 (Sept. 28, 1945), 3 C.F.R. 67 (1943-1948 Compilation), reprinted in 51 Stat. 884
(1945). This was followed by the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. 1331
(1953). The CCS, supra note 8, expanded and gave international sanction to this claim.
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territorial sea.'35 The only expansion of prevailing practice is
drafted into provisions making research and "any economic
activity" subject to coastal jurisdiction. The major impact of
the treaty, then, may well be in bringing consistency and pre-
dictability to an area of conflicting state practice.
From the grant of sovereign rights to coastal states it can
be predicted that state laws will result governing such subjects
as the preservation and protection of fisheries, erection of arti-
ficial structures, and pollution from ships. However, coastal
state duties and limitations upon these rights can be implied
from the language of the text in several areas, and is a neces-
sary implication if navigation is to be protected. For example,
the existence of a contiguous zone under article 3211 implies
limited authority within the economic zone. Original proposals
for the economic zone did not include provisions for a contig-
uous zone' 37 and many delegations at Caracas expressed the
view that the existence of the exclusive economic zone would
render it unnecessary. 3 1 Yet certain delegations expressed the
view that the enforcement of immigration, customs, fiscal and
sanitary regulations were attributes of territorial sovereignty,
not the right of economic exploitation and therefore incompati-
ble with the concept of an economic zone.'39 Further, it was
argued that a coastal state could seriously interfere with navi-
gation under the pretext of regulating its contiguous zone." '
The result of these debates was a preservation of the contiguous
zone in the RSNT,'' clearly indicating a limitation on coastal
state prescriptive authority within the exclusive economic
zone.
Consistent with the limitations implied from the existence
of a contiguous zone, it is clear that coastal states do not enjoy
territorial sovereignty within the economic zone. The sovereign
rights granted in the RSNT are topical, not territorial, with the
result that permissible coastal state activities are limited by
the nature of the topic. Therefore, the coastal state cannot
135. See note 112 supra.
136. See text accompanying note 80 supra.
137. Aguilar, The Patrimonial Sea or Economic Zone Concept, 11 S.D.L. REV.
579, 597 (1974).
138. OFFICIAL REPORTS, supra note 111, at 172, 188, 195.
139. See Statement of Mr. Caflisch (Switzerland), id. at 180.
140. See Statement of Mr. Serra (Portugal), id. at 172, and Statement of Mr.
Sapozhnikov (Ukranian Soviet Socialist Republic), id. at 201.
141. RSNT, supra note 21, art. 32.
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unreasonably alter the pattern of uses by other states within
the zone, for it has no plenary jurisdiction. The RSNT grants
the coastal state a right of exclusive use, not the right of a
territorial sovereign to determine entry and uses by other
states.
Even exclusive uses granted by the RSNT are subject to
restrictions. For example, article 48 grants coastal states exclu-
sive rights and jurisdiction over artificial islands and structures
relating to, or interfering with, economic exploitation.'42 But
this jurisdiction is subject to restrictions: due notice must be
given of construction of such installations; adequate warning
devices must be installed; abandoned structures must be en-
tirely removed; the coastal state may, where necessary, estab-
lish safety zones around such structures; but neither the zones
nor the structures themselves may be established where
"interference may be caused to the use of recognized sea lanes
essential to international navigation.""'
A broader limitation on coastal state discretion is found in
article 46(3) which provides that states "shall comply with laws
and regulations enacted by the coastal state in conformity with
this chapter and other rules of international law." The converse
of article 46(3) is that user states need not comply with coastal
state laws and regulations not enacted in conformity with rele-
vant rules of international law and the chapter defining the
rights and duties within the zone. It appears that conformity
or inconsistency with the chapter is to be found in the terms
of article 47, regarding residual rights discussed above.'
The demand of article 47, that conflicts regarding the at-
tribution of rights and jurisdiction in the exclusive economic
zone be resolved on the basis of equity, is made more explicit
in article 44 which requires that a coastal state have "due
respect" for the rights and duties of other states in the zone.
While read alone this may be a vague standard, the duty of
compliance is contingent upon laws enacted in conformity with
the chapter, not merely with article 44. The content of "due
regard," then, is to be found within the chapter defining the
economic zone as a whole, and particularly by the juridical
status of the zone derived principally from article 47.
142. This would appear to leave open the possibility that submarine tracking
devices and other military hardware could be implanted on the seabed without coastal
permission provided they in no way interfered with economic exploitation.
143. RSNT, supra note 21, art. 48(7).
144. See text accompanying note 123 and following supra.
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Managing the living resources of the exclusive economic
zone. The RSNT has not only granted coastal states the sover-
eign right to exploit the resources of the exclusive economic
zone, it has also granted them the sovereign right to enforce
laws passed to protect those resources. Although subject to the
"due regard" limitation, the RSNT grants the broadest en-
forcement authority to coastal states for the purpose of manag-
ing fishing."5 The text provides:
The coastal State may, in the exercise of its sovereign
rights to explore, exploit, conserve and manage the living
resources in the exclusive economic zone, take such mea-
sures, including boarding, inspection, arrest and judicial
proceedings, as may be necessary to ensure compliance
with the laws and regulations enacted by it in conformity
with the present Convention."8
It is important to note that this provision refers to sovereign
rights; that is, those provided only in article 44(1)(a), and then
only in regard to the living resources subject to sovereign rights.
Thus, the right to board and inspect vessels is not extended to
violations of laws made pursuant to authority over non-living
resources, research, and artificial structures. Hence, the scope
of this authority is relatively limited. Furthermore, these ex-
treme measures are limited to those cases "as may be neces-
sary" to insure compliance with properly enacted laws.
The article is perhaps overbroad in that it does not limit
boarding and arrest to fishing vessels. An additional inade-
quacy exists in that no duty is established to publicize the
regulations for which boarding is the penalty. A more balanced
article would subject merchant vessels to the extreme penalty
of boarding and arrest only where the measures which they
violate pose a serious threat to living resources, and would
require publicity for all regulations.
Protecting the marine environment of the exclusive eco-
nomic zone. Navigation can prosper on a sterile sea as well as
one teeming with life. Thus, navigational and environmental
interests are not necessarily coextensive-indeed they may
often conflict. Almost any regulation for the protection of the
145. This grant is accompanied by the duty to optimize the fishing catch. Where
the coastal state cannot harvest the entire catch, it must allow other nations, under
terms agreed to by the parties, to harvest the balance. See RSNT, supra note 21, arts.
51, 61.
146. Id. art. 61(1).
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environment will involve some inconvenience and expense for
navigation. Thus, it is in the interest of maritime and develop-
ing countries to oppose any coastal state regulations that might
inhibit or raise the cost of establishing merchant fleets." 7
The right enjoyed by coastal states to protect the marine
environment within the economic zone clearly includes the au-
thority to promulgate regulations to prevent vessel-source pol-
lution, although flag states have pre-emptive rights and duties
to enforce pollution regulations against their own ships."8
These measures could have a serious impact upon shipping if
they include regulation of vessel construction. In response to
this, the text provides that coastal state standards for vessel-
source pollution in the exlusive economic zone may not exceed
international standards and the arrest of a vessel violating
those standards is possible only in exceptional circumstances.
The scope of coastal authority to regulate vessel-source
pollution through prescribing standards for vessel construction
and the discharge of pollutants is one of the most difficult
problems addressed by the Conference. The approach most
favorable to the coastal states would permit pollution control
through national legislation in any area in which the coastal
state has an alleged interest."9 Proposals more favorable to
navigational interests provide that coastal state authority is
limited to legislative measures which are in conformity with
international standards. ,50 The RSNT adopts a position be-
tween these two proposals.' 5 '
It is universally accepted that only international rules and
those standards enacted by the flag state apply to ships on the
high seas; a provision to this effect is included in the RSNT.'52
Within the exclusive economic zone, while no general agree-
ment can be said to exist, RSNT article 21(4), Part III, limits
147. See Summary of Committee III Negotiations (Aug. 11, 1976) [on file at
SANTA CLARA L. REv.].
148. RSNT, supra note 21, Part III, art. 27. Flag states may also enforce stricter
standards against their own vessels than required by international law. See id. Part
III, art. 21(2).
149. See, e.g., U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/C. 2/L. 21/Rev. 1 (Nigeria) (1974),
reprinted in CARACAS DOCUMENTS, supra note 14, at 111.
150. Proposed Amendment by the Federal Republic of Germany, Summary of
Committee III Negotiations (Aug. 23, 1976) [on file at SANTA CLARA L. REv.].
151. It should be noted that the RSNT also contains provisions dealing with
ocean dumping, land-based pollution, and pollution from seabed activities, as well as
provisions concerning vessel-source pollution. See, e.g., RSNT, supra note 21, art. 4(3).
152. Id. Part H, art. 80. See also id. Part II, arts. 21, 26(1).
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coastal states to enacting legislation which conforms to inter-
national standards regarding vessel-source pollution. The text
clearly implies that no more stringent rules can be imposed.
Coastal state discretion in this area has been further weakened
by a proposal, which may be included during the next session
of the Conference, that these standards be "generally recog-
nized."' 53
Authority to enforce these regulations is somewhat broader
than the authority to promulgate them. Article 30(4), Part III,
governing the economic zone, provides that when a vessel has
violated applicable international pollution standards, the
coastal state may request specific information regarding port
of registry, last and next port of call, and other relevant infor-
mation needed to establish a violation. If the case involves a
"substantial discharge and significant pollution," under article
30(5), Part III, and the vessel has refused to give information,
or the information given is patently false, the coastal state may
undertake a physical inspection of the vessel to establish the
facts of the case. The article does not provide for arrest, but
where a vessel commits a "flagrant or gross" violation of appl-
icable international pollution standards in the exclusive eco-
nomic zone which leads to "major damage or threat of major
damage," the coastal state may take action in accordance with
national law, which presumably includes arrest.'54
In contrast, coastal states have greater authority to regu-
late pollution of their territorial waters. This is consistent with
the general RSNT scheme which varies the degree of coastal
state control with the distance from the coast and the severity
of the violations. Within the territorial sea, article 21(3), Part
III, provides that coastal states may establish national laws
and regulations regarding vessel-source pollution."' 5 The
coastal state group 5 ' argued that this article grants a coastal
state the unqualified authority to set domestic rules and stan-
dards in its territorial sea. The maritime states, however, refer
to article 20(2), Part II, which proscribes coastal states from
regulating "the design, construction, manning and equipment
153. See note 150 supra.
154. RSNT, supra note 21, Part II1, art. 30(6).
155. Id. Part III, art. 21(3).
156. See U.N. Doc. A/AC. 138/SC. I/L. 10 Rep. 180 (Kenya) (1972); U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 62/C. 2/L. 21/Rev. 1 (Nigeria) (1974), reprinted in CARACAS DOCUMENTS,
supra note 14, at 111; U.N. Doc. AICONF. 62/C. 2/L. 82 (African States) (1974),
reprinted in CARACAS DOCUMENTS, supra note 14, at 186.
1977]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
of foreign ships," and argue that this should take precedence
over article 21(3), Part III. The debate on this inconsistency
revealed fairly strong support for the primacy of article 20(2),
Part II, but the conflict was such that a compromise version
may appear authorizing the coastal state to regulate ship de-
sign, construction, manning and equipment.'57
Enforcement powers are also greater within the territorial
sea. Article 30(2), Part III, provides that where clear grounds
exist for believing a ship has violated applicable national or
international rules, the coastal state may take steps to inspect
the vessel, and where justified by the evidence, arrest the vessel
according to local law.
Conclusion
In light of the above, it is clear that, at least for naviga-
tional purposes, the RSNT has created no territorial sea in the
exclusive economic zone. Although the navigation rights of
maritime states are subject to the provisions of the RSNT, they
are not specifically subject to the control of coastal states; each
state must have due regard for the rights of others. The RSNT
seems to have reached a balance that should protect the legiti-
mate interests of states in both navigation and resource exploi-
tation. The provisions insure that no unreasonable interference
with navigation should occur in the future.
NAVIGATIONAL RIGHTS OF WARSHIPS
A matter of fundamental concern to any sea power is the
ability to dispatch its naval forces to whatever part of the globe
its national interest dictates. 5 ' Yet this concern may conflict
with the interests of coastal states in exercising sovereignty
over adjacent waters, or interfere with the navigational inter-
ests of other states. Naval mobility is thus a crucial and contro-
versial issue in current law of the sea negotiations.
As with navigational rights in general, freedom for war-
ships "'59 traditionally varies according to the ocean regime in-
157. See note 151 supra.
158. This ability is seen to serve a variety of military functions: maintaining
adequate strategic nuclear capability; insuring adequate intelligence and military sur-
veillance; and providing guaranteed quick response to any need to protect citizens,
commerce or access to critical resources wherever they may be. See HOLLICK & OSGOOD,
supra note 53, at 75.
159. The CHS, supra note 8, article 8(2) and the RSNT, supra note 21, article
28 both define a warship as:
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volved. In the high seas, complete freedom of navigation ap-
plies to warships as well as merchant vessels' 0 and the former
enjoy immunity in all regimes from the jurisdiction of any state
other than the flag state.'6' Navigational freedom includes the
right of maritime countries to conduct naval exercises on the
high seas free from unreasonable interference.' What consti-
tutes unreasonable interference would be difficult to elaborate
in any text, and the RSNT makes no attempt to clarify the
term.' 3
Within territorial waters not used for international naviga-
tion, publicists, conventions, and international practice are not
in accord over the right of warships to innocent passage.' 6' Un-
like the situation in international straits,"5 there is no overrid-
ing need for transit between seas justifying a sacrifice of coastal
state security interests. Unlike merchant vessels, warships are
specialized for the use of force and are often deployed for the
purpose of achieving coercive effects.' Coastal states thus may
perceive a genuine need for protecting themselves against such
possibilities.
Prior to 1949, authors tended toward the view that war-
ships had no right of innocent passage.6 7 The International
Law Commission, in preparation for the 1958 Law of the Sea
Conference, recommended a provision requiring prior authori-
zation for warships to pass through the territorial sea.' This
recommendation was not adopted, although some states re-
served such a power when ratifying the CTS.65
a ship belonging to the [naval] forces of a State [and] bearing the
external marks distinguishing [warships] of its nationality, under the
command of an officer duly commissioned by the [glovernment . . . and
whose name appears in the . . . [Navy] [L]ist .... and manned by a
crew [who are] under regular [naval] discipline.
160. See RSNT, supra note 21, art. 76; CHS, supra note 8, art. 2.
161. RSNT, supra note 21, art. 83; CHS, supra note 8, art. 8(1).
162. See Brock, Threats to Freedom of Navigation, 24 JAG J. 75, 78 (Dec. 1969-
Jan. 1970).
163. See RSNT, supra note 21, art. 76(2). For the text of this article, see note
126 supra. The CHS contains a similar provision requiring "reasonable regard" for the
interests of other states. CHS, supra note 8, art. 2.
164. Most nations do permit passage of warships, but regard it as a privilege
rather than a right and contend that prior authorization may be required. Deddish,
The Right of Passage by Warships Through International Straits, 24 JAG J. 79, 82
(Dec. 1969-Jan. 1970).
165. See text accompanying note 57 supra.
166. See BURKE, supra note 76, at 10.
167. Id. at 9. n.66.
168. Id.
169. The Soviet Union, Romania, Ukranian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czecho-
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In addition to prior authorization, the questions of sub-
merged passage for submarines 7 ' and the right of coastal state
jurisdiction over warships for violations of innocent passage
were negotiated in 1958. The resulting compromise in the CTS
requires surface transit of submarines' 7' and limits the author-
ity of coastal states over naval vessels to insisting that "the
warship leave the territorial sea."' 72
The RSNT, like the CTS, extends the right of innocent
passage to all vessels in the territorial sea.'73 And, as it reduces
the discretionary aspect of the earlier concepts of innocent pas-
sage, it strengthens the right for warships as well as all others.
A vocal group of states still opposes this concept, however, and
the issue will be raised in further sessions of the conference,
although no major changes in the text are expected.'74
In regard to international straits, the right of passage for
warships has been recognized at least since the 1949 Corfu
Channel Case.'75 In its decision, the International Court of Jus-
tice held:
It is, in the opinion of the Court, generally recognized that
in accordance with international custom that states in
time of peace have a right to send their warships through
straits used for international navigation between two parts
of the high seas without previous authorization of a coastal
state, provided that the passage is innocent. Unless other-
wise prescribed in an international Convention, there is no
right for a coastal state to prohibit such passage through
straits in time of peace.'78
The CTS provision on passage through straits is based
upon the Corfu Channel Case'77 and the interpretation of this
slovakia, Colombia, and Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic all reserved the right
to establish procedures for prior authorization for warships passing through territorial
waters. Declaration and Reservations to the Convention, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/3 Rev. 1
(1962), reprinted in MCDOUGAL & BURKE, supra note 1, at 1180-84.
170. From the perspective of the United States, the unannounced underwater
passage of nuclear-powered submarines carrying nuclear missiles is an important stra-
tegic weapon. See HOLLICK & OSGOOD, supra note 53, at 78.
171. CTS, supra note 8, art. 14(6).
172. Id. art. 23.
173. See RSNT, supra note 21, arts. 28-31. Article 19 preserves the rule regarding
surface transit of submarines and article 29 the enforcement power. A new provision,
article 30, subjects the flag state to liability for damage caused by warships resulting
from non-compliance with regulations or laws.
174. See BURKE, supra note 76, at 15.
175. Corfu Channel Case, [1949] I.C.J. 4.
176. Id. at 28.
177. See McDoUGAL & BURKE, supra note 1, at 208-12.
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provision by some maritime states has relied upon the language
above; thus, they have resisted any efforts on the part of strait
states to require prior authorization for surface transit.' How-
ever, neither the court, nor the CTS contains any discussion of
the right of submerged passage through international straits,
and this has been a major focus of negotiations at the Third
Conference."'
As presently drafted, the RSNT provides for the right of
submerged passage through straits by guaranteeing freedom of
navigation, without qualification to "all ships and aircraft."',"
Thus, the rights of warships in international straits are as fully
protected as those of merchant ships, and in general the RSNT
does not make material distinctions between the two types of
vessels in any of the regimes under consideration.
CONCLUSION
The premise underlying this analysis has been that navi-
gation should remain as unobstructed as possible. Coastal state
exploitation of resources is vital to many developed and devel-
oping countries, and navigational interests may suffer inconve-
nience as a result of this activity. However, all nations have an
equal interest in expeditious and inexpensive transit.
Because the participants in the Law of the Sea Conference
fully expect to conclude with a treaty or convention,8 ' future
problems arising over navigational activity will be resolved on
the basis of the balance struck in the RSNT, which is, regard-
ing navigational issues, virtually complete. Even in the ab-
sence of a treaty, the years of expertise and negotiation that
have produced the text mark it as the definitive statement on
many areas of current maritime law. Transit passage in straits,
innocent passage in the territorial sea, and sea lanes passage
through archipelagic waters collectively provide adequate pro-
tection for navigational freedom. Under these provisions, war-
ships and ships engaged in commerce should be free from un-
reasonable interference by coastal states.
Assessing the impact of the exclusive economic zone is
more difficult due to the novelty of its principles. For a number
178. See, e.g., the statement of Mr. Stevenson (United States) at the Caracas
session of the Conference. OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 111, at 135.
179. See BURKE, supra note 76, at 22-23.
180. RSNT, supra note 21, art. 37(1).
181. Id., Note by the President of the Conference, at 2.
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of reasons, including the protection of navigation, a coastal
state should be under a clear and unambiguous duty of non-
discrimination in its treatment of vessels within the zone. Cur-
rently it is not. However, references to coastal state "peace,
good order, and security" which could justify interference are
absent. So too are references regarding customs and immigra-
tion regulations. Essential sea lanes are preserved, and pollu-
tion regulations are moderate. Aside from an overly strong arti-
cle on the enforcement of fishery regulations, it appears that
the sovereign right of resource exploitation is properly balanced
by the principle of "due regard" within a "co-operative zonal
regime," and, thus, the economic zone can equitably secure the
needs of all states.
If the needs of all people are to be adequately served, a
treaty must be concluded that will carry a great variety of
interests into an increasingly crowded future. It appears that
the navigational principles embodied in Part II of the RSNT
will be sufficient, if adopted, to accomplish this purpose.
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